INTRODUCTION
The mandatory death penalty for the crime of murder is in rapid retreat worldwide. Originally diffused to the common law countries of the Caribbean, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia by way of the British Empire, the penalty has been found unconstitutional and incompatible with human rights norms in at least ten Caribbean nations since the year 2000. A new wave of litigation has appeared in the postcolonial common law nations of East and Southern Africa, and courts in Malawi, Uganda, and now Kenya have found an automatic sentence of death unconstitutional and have replaced mandatory schemes with discretionary ones that allow consideration of mitigating factors in the capital sentencing process. 1 The resulting criminal justice regimes operate in closer conformity with international human rights norms and explicitly adopt these norms in their domestic legal systems.
This harmonization of death penalty regimes across borders is no accident: it was the deliberate intention of a small network of international antideath penalty advocates to create a body of transnational jurisprudence from which to draw in bringing incremental challenges in national courts. 2 By initially petitioning the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the InterAmerican Human Rights System to find the mandatory death penalty incompatible with human rights treaty obligations, this core of advocates succeeded in developing a corpus of persuasive reasoning on which they could of jurisprudence have the same two holdouts: Malaysia and Singapore, which are also former British colonies. The constitutions of these two countries do not include the right to a fair trial or protections against cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment.'
2 Although the mandatory death penalty has been extinguished in most of the Caribbean, it still survives in Southeast Asia.
This Article will turn first to the two major common law retentionist powers that have invalidated the mandatory death penalty: the United States and India. These decisions provided legal groundwork for launching a series of challenges in the Caribbean. This Article then distinguishes the jurisprudence arising from Malaysia and Singapore, which have resisted challenges for reasons that are peculiar to their constitutional regimes. Finally, this Article analyzes the three most recent decisions invalidating the mandatory death penalty, arising from the Constitutional Court of Malawi, the Supreme Court of Uganda, and the Court of Appeal of Kenya. Each of these three decisions has made a unique contribution to the body of global common law death penalty jurisprudence. As mandatory death penalty challenges advance in halfa dozen more African countries, these three decisions will become especially important as persuasive authority. The result will be a death penalty regime harmonized across borders, in which the death penalty is confined only to the rarest and most serious cases, incorporating international human rights norms in sentencing proceedings.
II. PROLOGUE: THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA
The first coordinated challenge to the mandatory nature of the death penalty began in the United States. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids "cruel and unusual punishments.'
' 13 In two five-tofour Supreme Court decisions in 1976, the United States abolished the common law mandatory death penalty in Woodson v. North Carolina and a more limited statutory mandatory death penalty in Roberts v. Louisiana. 1 4 Although North Carolina's death penalty scheme was in constitutional danger because it included the common law offenses of accomplice liability and felony murder, thus automatically dispensing a death sentence for defendants who did not possess actual intention to kill, observers had predicted that Louisiana's more narrowly-tailored statute requiring actual rather than constructive intent would survive.1 5 However, the same five Justices that struck down the North Carolina statute in Woodson voted to strike down Louisiana's statute in Roberts. 16 Eleven years later in Sumner v. Shuman, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a Nevada statute mandating the death penalty for prisoners who committed first degree murder while already under a sentence of life imprisonment, the narrowest and most defensible class of cases. 17 Through these cases, the Supreme Court made clear that any non-discretionary death sentence was unconstitutional.
In all three decisions, the Court's reasoning was the same: the mandatory death penalty simultaneously permitted too little discretion in the sentencing process, and too much. 1 8 A mandatory death sentence exacerbated the problem of jury nullification because juries acquit defendants at higher rates in mandatory regimes in order to avoid death sentences.' 9 When fact-finders decide guilt and sentence simultaneously, they risk merging the two decisions, acquitting a guilty defendant in order to avoid a death sentence. As a result, the sentencing discretion ordinarily granted to the fact-finder is transferred to other, less transparent, actors. For example, if prosecutors believe the death penalty is not warranted, they can prosecute for manslaughter or non-capital murder. Similarly, appellate courts review more robustly in sentencing inquiries, and executive clemency bodies grant clemency at high rates. A trial judge, after weighing evidence and interpreting witness candor and demeanor, is especially well-placed to determine a defendant's sentence. By constraining a judge's sentencing discretion at trial, a mandatory death penalty makes sentencing more arbitrary and opaque.
A closely related factor from the Court's reasoning in the three decisions was that a mandatory death penalty failed to appropriately individualize a sentence to the relevant aspects of the character and record of the defendant. 20 A mandatory sentence treats all individuals as "a faceless, undifferentiated mass 14 
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[Vol. 22:2 to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death."' l Because death was qualitatively different from other criminal sentences, it required special care: the "fundamental respect for humanity" underlying the Eighth Amendment required consideration of the person of the offender and the circumstances of the crime. 22 Other safeguards notwithstanding, the clear concern was that a defendant could receive a disproportionately harsh sentence for a crime, a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In 1983, the Supreme Court of India followed the Woodson Court's lead. In Mithu v. State of Punjab, the Indian court found that the mandatory sentence 23 offended constitutional rights on grounds similar to the American court. In addition, the Mithu Court found that the legislature could not remove sentencing discretion from judges and require them to inflict death sentences in all murder cases.
2 4 This was the origin of a separation of powers argument against the mandatory sentence. A legislature cannot delegate criminal sentencing discretion, a traditional judicial function, to legislative or executive actors. Mithu, the functional equivalent of Sumner v. Shuman because it involved the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty for homicide for life-term prisoners, foreordained a shift in Indian criminal sentencing policy. Beginning with Singh (Macchi) v. State ofPunjab, the Court required judges to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining a criminal sentence. 2 6 With the Woodson and Mithu lines of cases, the mandatory death penalty retreated from the major retentionist common law powers.
III. SUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENT: THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
In the past decade, the mandatory death penalty has been overturned in nearly every common law Caribbean nation.7 The near-extinction of the penalty is the result of a coordinated series of challenges brought initially before the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Human Rights System with the intention of forming a body of persuasive jurisprudence that could be used in binding national court systems. 2 8 These early challenges were based on Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the mirror clauses in the American Convention on Human Rights, which uphold the right to life and limit the death [Vol. 22:2 penalty to only "the most serious crimes." 29 In both challenges, the fatal factor was that the mandatory death penalty was not individually tailored to fit the crime and could result in the execution of those without actual intent to kill through felony-murder or accomplice liability. These were not considered to be "most serious crimes" within the scope of the treaties. 30 In the seminal case Edwards v. Bahamas, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that the mandatory death penalty violated the right to fair trial in addition to the right to life under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
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Within several years, these challenges produced settled law in the Commonwealth Caribbean.
3 2
This early, non-binding jurisprudence developed a body of persuasive law available to national constitutional courts. As with the international treaties, every Caribbean constitution contains a provision upholding the right to life with a death penalty exception, or savings clause, a provision prohibiting cruel and inhuman punishment, and a provision upholding the right to a fair trial.
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Through the interplay of these three clauses, anti-death penalty advocates could challenge the mandatory death penalty for murder. Caribbean constitutions contain an added layer of complexity: a clause forbidding constitutional challenges to forms of punishment in existence at the time of independence from Great Britain on the grounds that these punishments violated the 29 fundamental rights provisions of the constitutions. 34 Of the twelve Commonwealth constitutions, eight possess a "partial" savings clause limited solely to judicial punishments while three possess a "general" savings clause preventing constitutional challenge to any law in force at the time of independence. Only Belize, the last to receive independence in 198 1, had a clause that expired five years after independence. 36 By then, broad savings clauses were perceived to be constitutional anachronisms-constraints on developing notions of constitutionalism.
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In early 2000, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London (then the court of final resort for most of the Commonwealth Caribbean) accepted a petition from the Belize Court of Appeal, which had upheld the mandatory death penalty in a constitutional challenge. 38 The Privy Council combined it with a petition from the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal arising from Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Lucia, which had invalidated the penalty. 39 The Privy Council did not distinguish among the countries; it found all of the mandatory death penalty provisions to be unconstitutional, holding that a sentence that did not permit mitigating evidence could be disproportionately harsh and thus, cruel and inhuman. 40 The
Privy Council also found that executive clemency discretion could not save a mandatory death penalty, as trial judges were in a better position to assess evidence and witness credibility. 4 ' The Belizean case Reyes v. Queen remains the seminal Privy Council decision on the mandatory death penalty and has since been extended to most of the Caribbean.
For the three countries that possessed "general" savings clausesBarbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad -the question was closer. In 2003, although two five-judge panels of the Privy Council had invalidated the mandatory death 34 penalty for ordinary murder in Trinidad and Tobago 42 and for felony murder in Barbados, 43 both decisions were reversed by the full Council. According to the Council, although a "partial" savings clause preventing challenge to judicial punishments did not prevent challenge to the mandatory death penalty because it was only a manner of sentencing and not a "punishment" per se, the mandatory death penalty was saved under "general" savings clauses that preserved all laws in existence at the time of independence. 44 Consequently, the Privy Council upheld the mandatory death penalty for Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. However, the Council found that Jamaica's mandatory death statute postdated independence because it was revised to narrow the scope of the sentence and, consequently, it was not saved. 4 5 Barbados has discussed the possibility of making the death penalty non-mandatory, and the penalty continues to survive in Trinidad and Tobago. 4 6 As part of a broader campaign against the mandatory death penalty in Trinidad and Tobago, the London-based Death Penalty Project and the University of the West Indies commissioned a survey of public opinion, to discern the level of public support commanded by a mandatory death penalty as opposed to a discretionary death penalty. 47 The survey authors commissioned a representative sample of 1,000 residents, a large sample for the country's size, and asked them three hypothetical questions about a felony murder, a domestic murder, and a drug murder, each with two examples. One example included a possible mitigating factor and the other did not include the mitigating factor. 8 The results were unsurprising. Although 89% of Trinidadians favored the death penalty, only 26% favored the current mandatory death penalty law. 49 The survey results suggested that the mandatory death penalty obscured problems of policing and investigations by over-punishing the small proportion of cases successfully won by the prosecution (often domestic murder in which the 42 [Vol. 22:2 perpetrator was known, and usually related, to the victim). 50 Indeed, because the most brutal murders such as drug or gang-related murders often went unpunished, a mandatory death penalty did not necessarily correlate with the most serious crimes. 5 " Sixty-three percent of respondents favored a discretionary death penalty, and 73% believed that the abolition of the death penalty would bring about more murder convictions because a jury would not be forced to choose between manslaughter and death. 52 All of these findings reflect well-known weaknesses of mandatory death penalty regimes and have important implications for other jurisdictions in the developing world.
IV. THE HOLDOUTS: MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE
Uniquely in the common law world, Malaysia and Singapore have upheld their mandatory death penalty regimes from constitutional challenge. 5 3 Both countries have historically high rates of execution, particularly for higherincome countries as wealth is generally correlated to abolition. 54 The political culture in both countries contributes to this phenomenon: a strong executive balanced with a relatively weak judicial power, a law and order ethos on the part of the government, and an intolerance of political dissent.
5 5 Although the constitutions of both countries delineate fundamental rights, these rights do not include the right to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, or the right to a fair trial in broad form, despite the presence of limited components of these rights such as a ban on double jeopardy and arbitrary arrest. 56 Both countries allow broad derogations and suspensions of certain civil liberties to a much broader degree than elsewhere in the common law world if "necessary or expedient in the interest of security."'" This constitutional structure is different from the bulk of former British colonies in Africa and the Caribbean, and has failed to provide a basis for bringing a challenge to the mandatory death sentence.
Malaysia and Singapore are also unique in the common law world 50. Id. at 3 (indicating that domestic-related murders accounted for 36% of all persons convicted of murder and sentenced to death). By contrast, gang-related murders or murders where the body was "dumped" accounted for 33% of the recorded killings but accounted for only 2% of the convictions for murder and manslaughter. Id. at 2. The report also undermined a proposed policy of creating a new, statutorily limited class of murder subject to the mandatory death penalty, such as violent felonies. because they possess the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking, which accounts for a disproportionately high percentage of actual executions in both countries. 58 The penalty has been criticized by both the legal community and the medical community as falling too heavily on foreign nationals, especially migrant workers, and on drug runners and "mules" rather than drug lords. 59 Although the mandatory death sentence for drug trafficking was originally upheld by the Privy Council in the 1981 case, Ong Ah Chuan v. Public
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Prosecutor, the case was overruled by Reyes v. Queen and its progeny. Nonetheless, the decision forms the bedrock of Malaysian and Singaporean constitutional defenses to the mandatory death penalty. Malaysian courts upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking in Public Prosecutor v. Lau Kee Hoo (1983),61 and Singapore did so in Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor (2004) .62 In the latter case, the Singapore Court of Appeal found that customary international law did not import a ban on inhuman punishment into Singaporean constitutional law, and the Court rejected a separation of powers challenge to the penalty. 6 3 In 2010, the Singapore Court of Appeal revisited the constitutionality of mandatory death for drug trafficking in Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor. The Court interpreted Woodson, Mithu, and the Caribbean jurisprudence in great detail and distinguished them on the basis of Singapore's different constitutional structure. 64 As in Nguyen Tuong Van, the Court found that although the European Convention of Human Rights applied to Singapore for ten years prior to independence, the rights delineated in the Convention were not applicable to Singapore after independence and were disavowed in the independence constitution. 65 The Court also rejected an equal protection of the law argument, in which the appellant argued that the schedule of penalties based on the quantity of the drugs being trafficked was arbitrary, including 67 Consequently, the mandatory death sentence in both countries is a slippery target for anti-death penalty advocates because the reasoning of the constitutional challenges is circular. The appellant argued that the mandatory death penalty was an inhuman punishment under international customary law even though Singapore specifically disavowed the existence of such customary law and failed to incorporate such a prohibition into the constitution. The same is true of the due process challenge to the mandatory death penalty. The Singapore Court of Appeal has rejected analogies to the constitutional protections of fair trial rights in other Commonwealth countries because such rights are specifically excluded in Singapore's constitution. 68 The Court is one of the few national courts to have rejected outright constitutional challenges on the basis of delay or conditions on death row. Of the two countries, Singapore is likely the more unyielding in its defense of the mandatory death penalty, but the sentence looks to remain legal and active in both countries for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the impact of this jurisprudence is limited given the unique constitutional structures in both countries-strong executives, weak fundamental rights protections, and isolation from human rights treatiesthat make these countries clearly distinguishable from the Caribbean and African lines of cases.
V. THE NEW FRONTIER: COMMON LAW AFRICA
With the contraction of the mandatory death penalty in the Caribbean, and despite the holdouts in Southeast Asia, an international network of lawyers and experts led by the London-based Death Penalty Project and their partners launched a series of challenges to the mandatory death penalty in African common law nations with the explicit goal of incrementally working toward total abolition of capital punishment. These challenges have been successful so far in Malawi, 6 9 Uganda, 70 planned in at least six other common law African countries. Each of these decisions relied heavily on foreign and international precedent, including the Caribbean case law, and each has made an important contribution in their own right to the corpus of global death penalty jurisprudence. As in the Caribbean, these challenges are premised on the similarity among common law African constitutional structures. British officials working with African nationalist leaders meticulously drafted at least thirty-three complete and final constitutions with varying levels of public input. 73 Within a decade, most of these constitutions had been abrogated, amended, or replaced, but fundamental rights provisions tended not to be heavily altered. Currently, every common law African constitution other than South Africa and Namibia contains a death penalty savings clause on the model of the European Convention on Human Rights: "No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided in law. 74 This savings clause model is intended to prevent direct legal challenge to the death penalty. African constitutions possess similar provisions prohibiting inhuman punishment and supporting the right to a fair trial as well as constitutional procedures for seeking clemency or pardon from the executive.
This sharing occurred with substantive law as well. Former British colonies in Africa received similar penal and criminal procedure codes, based on the 1899 Queensland, Australia penal code and the 1877 Gold Coast procedure code, with improvements mediated through the legal system of British India. 75 Consequently, the mandatory death penalty passed intact to British Africa without any benefit from the legal reforms that swept Great Britain itself in the 1950s and 1960s. The mandatory death penalty, however, was always too harsh for post-colonial African legal culture, particularly as many African countries outside of the Islamic zone had a spotty tradition of capital punishment prior to the colonial era. 76 Many common law African countries send enormous numbers of men to death row, but far fewer to the gallows. Hundreds of criminals are placed on death row each year in common law Africa while these same countries average only two to three judicial 72 78 In a targeted challenge, the Court found the penalty violated 1) the right to be free from cruel, inhuman punishment because the sentence was not individually tailored to the crime; 2) the right to a fair trial because a defendant did not have an opportunity in a judicial proceeding to present mitigating evidence on her behalf, and 3) the right of access to the court system because the defendant did not have a venue through which to appeal guilt and sentence separately. Caribbean jurisprudence extensively, as well as the South African case Makwanyane, in which the Constitutional Court of South Africa found the death penalty unconstitutional. 86 As an additional ground for invalidating the mandatory death penalty, the Constitutional Court found that the penalty violated the right to a fair trial and that an accused person has a right to an individualized sentencing determination based on all the evidence presented. 87 The Court specifically held that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that every person convicted of a crime must be permitted effective appellate review, and because a mandatory death penalty determines guilt and sentence simultaneously, the penalty precludes a higher court from reviewing a sentence on its own merits.
88
For this, the judges cited the seminal case Edwards v. Bahamas. 89 The Court also found that a mandatory death penalty violated the right of access to justice as enshrined in Malawi's constitution, constituting a third ground for invalidating the penalty.90 Interpreting the right more broadly than the right to a fair trial, the Court found that because the mandatory death penalty does not permit a sentencing hearing and precludes appellate review of a sentence, it effectively denies an accused person's right to access the judicial system for resolving legal disputes. 9 ' Unlike the inhuman punishment and fair trial grounds, the Court raised the right of access to justice sua sponte; the issue was not raised by the parties themselves.
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Several months later, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the result in a separate case, Jacob v. Republic, an appeal against sentence. 9 3 The Supreme Court affirmed Kafantayeni in its entirety and indicated that it was "largely persuaded" by the jurisprudence of the Privy Council. 94 Using a more textual approach than the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court interpreted Article 42 of the constitution, the "right to adduce and challenge evidence," as a basis for finding that the mandatory death penalty violated an accused's right to a fair trial by not permitting consideration of mitigating circumstances. 95 The result of the two cases, according to the Court, was that every prisoner on death row in Malawi was entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing. [Vol. 22:2 right to life provision of the Malawi Constitution in Kafantayeni, the decision has been interpreted by lower courts as standing for the proposition that the right to life is inviolable except in the application of a discretionary death penalty. 97 In Republic v. Cheuka, the Malawi High Court (a trial-level court) convicted a police officer of manslaughter due to police brutality, holding that extrajudicial police killing was a violation of the right to life. 98 According to the High Court, the right to life is inviolable except for the death penalty, and even that exception was narrowly construed by the Constitutional Court in Kafantayeni. 9 9 In partial reliance on Kafantayeni, the High Court judge wrote that "the right to life ranks supreme to all other rights guaranteed by [the] Constitution," the "most fundamental of all rights in that it is a prerequisite for the enjoyment or exercise of all other rights."' 00 The judge analyzed the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement, and concluded that the extrajudicial killing at the hands of a police officer fell below international law enforcement standards. 101 This case strongly suggests that lower courts in Malawi will view the decision broadly and apply the rationale to other contexts.
Progress in resentencing death row prisoners after Kafantayeni, however, has been minimal. As of 2010, of the nearly 200 persons on death row in Malawi, only a handful had even consulted a lawyer, and not a single resentencing hearing had taken place.
1 0 2 While many common law African countries suffer from a shortage of legal representation, the shortage in Malawi is particularly acute. students to shoulder some of the burden in representing defendants who are entitled to review of their sentences.
1 0 6
B. The Supreme Court of Uganda: Kigula
Unlike the targeted appeal in Malawi, the Ugandan challenge was an omnibus challenge to the death penalty. The appellants argued that 1) the death penalty was an inhumane punishment and alternatively, that the mandatory sentence of death was unconstitutional; 2) hanging was impermissible as a mode of execution; and 3) a long delay on death row could make an otherwise constitutional sentence unconstitutional.
1 0 7 The decision of the Ugandan Constitutional Court in Kigula v. Attorney General essentially split the difference and found that the mandatory death penalty and inordinate delay were unconstitutional, while upholding a discretionary death penalty and hanging as a method of execution.
10 8 Unlike the Malawian court, the Ugandan majority opinion interpreted Ugandan law much more closely and engaged in a more textual-based constitutional analysis. The concurrences used a range of constitutional interpretive methods, including culturalist arguments,' 09 framers' intent, l 0 and popular opinion.l"' A dissenting opinion argued that the criminal justice system provided sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness, including legal aid for indigent defendants,' 12 the right of automatic appeal, 13 and the right to petition for clemency." 14 Both parties cross-appealed the Constitutional Court decision before the Supreme Court of Uganda in Attorney General v. Kigula. The Supreme Court voted unanimously to uphold the death penalty per se, but to strike down the mandatory death sentence for murder and unconstitutional delay and conditions on death row."1 5 The Court also voted six to one to turn away the challenge to hanging as a method of execution.' 6 As with the Constitutional Court, the Textually, the Constitution favored a finding upholding the death penaltyper se since it not only included a death penalty savings clause, but also a right to legal representation for capital defendants at the expense of the state and the right to seek clemency. 18 These provisions did not bear on the specific issue of the mandatory death penalty, however, and the Constitutional Review Commission conclusions could be read as favoring a discretionary death penalty. 119
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's finding that a fair trial included both conviction and sentencing stages and that a defendant is entitled to present mitigating evidence and have the sentence subject to appellate review.1 20 The Court also reached the separation of powers argument that the Malawian court did not reach and found that the penalty was unconstitutional because a mandatory death penalty ties the hands of judges in their inherent constitutional power to determine both conviction and sentence. 21 Regarding the argument that the mandatory death penalty constituted cruel and inhuman punishment, the Supreme Court took a slightly different approach than the lower court though both interpreted domestic precedent much more extensively than the Malawian court did. The Constitutional Court heavily relied on Kyamanywa, which invalidated adult corporal punishment as inhuman and degrading. 122 The Supreme Court relied instead on Abuki, in which the Court had struck down banishment as a penalty for witchcraft.
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Considering delay and conditions of death row, the Supreme Court looked in detail at the "demeaning" conditions at Luzira Prison. 124 The Court held that a prisoner has a right to sufficient time in which to exercise all avenues of appeal before execution, but cannot be unduly kept in prison for an indefinite period and essentially serve a lengthy prison sentence before a death sentence. constitutional challenge. 26 This may have been the weakest part of the decision. The Court found that the mandatory death penalty was a sentence in itself and consequently fell within the scope ofAbuki, which laid out guidelines for determining whether a sentence constituted cruel and inhuman punishment. On the issue of hanging, however, the Court found that it was only the manner of executing a sentence and not a sentence in itself and consequently fell outside the scope of Abuki.1 27 This distinction is, at best, a fine one. In fact, it conflicts with the long line of Privy Council jurisprudence holding that the mandatory death penalty is not a judicial punishment subject to the partial savings clause in many Caribbean constitutions, but rather simply a method of sentencing.' 28 The dissent by Justice Egonda-Ntende laid out in detail the harsh effects of hanging and argued that, like the mandatory death penalty, hanging was not specifically saved under the constitution and could be found unconstitutional. 29 Given the tension in the majority opinion, hanging as a method of execution in common law countries continues to be constitutionally vulnerable even though the argument did not win support from the Ugandan courts.
Kigula has led to a revolution in Ugandan sentencing law, despite some inconsistencies in the landmark decision's real-world application. In April 2010, the Ugandan Court of Appeal upheld two death sentences after considering mitigating factors such as a three-year delay in prison before trial, remorse for the murder of a relative, and dependents of the defendants. 3 0 According to the Court, however, "considering the injuries received and the weapon used, the conduct of the appellants before and after commission of the offence, [irresistibly] point to premeditated murder.' 131 In that case, the testimony showed that the defendants lay in wait for the victim and attacked her with pangas six times. These were circumstances that the justices felt outweighed the mitigating factors. In a similar case, the Court ruled that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors where the defendant violently murdered his seventy-year-old step-grandmother. 32 In mitigation, the defendant-appellant argued that he was a first-time offender, that he was on remand for four years before conviction, and that he had a wife and five children. 33 The defendant also argued a defense that he was protected by the Because this case presented fairly strong facts for armed robbery, the emphasis of the justices on the fact that no one was killed suggests that the Court will be skeptical of death sentences for armed robbery in the future. In October 2011, the Ugandan newspaper The Monitor reported that the Ugandan High Court reduced three death sentences for convicts in aggravated robbery trials to imprisonment of fifteen and twenty years, respectively. 42 This supports the hypothesis that, now freed of the mandatory death requirement, judges in Uganda will be skeptical of death sentences in non-murder cases. 143 In a series of cases, the Ugandan Court of Appeals reversed the murder convictions of defendants who had been sentenced to death. In June 2010, the Court of Appeal reversed not only a death sentence, but a murder conviction, where the prosecution failed to prove malice aforethought when the defendant used the handle, rather than the blade, of a weapon to hit the victim, a young child.'44 Although the Court addressed the mitigating factors of the defendant as a first-time offender and a young father, it reversed the murder charge and convicted him of manslaughter given the parts of the body affected and the number and nature of the injuries on the victim, which underscored a lack of intent to kill. 1 45 The Court was also troubled by the fact that the assessors in the trial unanimously recommended a manslaughter sentence to the trial judge, and consequently sentenced the defendant to fifteen years in prison, retroactive to when the defendant was first convicted. 146 In another case, the Ugandan Court of Appeal reversed the conviction outright and acquitted and freed the defendant due to contradictions in testimony and the failure of a proper initial investigation.
14 7 Although the Court noted several factors in mitigation of a death sentence, emphasizing the defendant as a first-time offender, the Court ultimately excluded some hearsay evidence and found that "the learned trial judge erred in convicting the appellant on scanty circumstantial evidence adduced by prosecution," which fell far short of the standard of proof required.14 While a practitioner often appeals both guilt and sentence in murder cases, judges do not have a chance to reach the sentencing issue when the guilt inquiry leads to reversal.
By ruling that all prisoners on death row for longer than three years should have their sentences commuted to life imprisonment "without remission," the Ugandan Supreme Court in Kigula created an interpretive problem since the Prisons Act states that "imprisonment for life" should be construed as twenty years imprisonment rather than "whole life" imprisonment. 149 In addition to the twenty-year rule under the Prisons Act, prison officials retained some discretion to shorten the sentence for good behavior.15 0 After the Ugandan Court of Appeal upheld a conviction of child rape and a sentence of life imprisonment in Stephen Tigo v. Uganda, the Supreme Court squarely confronted the issue of the meaning of life imprisonment under Section 47(6) of the Prisons Act, which states that a sentence of life imprisonment should be deemed to be twenty years. 151 In Tigo, the Supreme Court clarified Kigula by indicating that whole life or natural life imprisonment was warranted for those prisoners who were spared the death [Vol. 22:2 286 penalty, rather than imprisonment for twenty years, because Kigula intended to impose the next most severe sentence and specific prison sentences for longer than twenty years are not uncommon in the country. 5 2 Although the Court ruled that Stephen Tigo' s imprisonment should be twenty years based on other grounds, the Court was clear that it would be an absurd result if life imprisonment were construed to be a lesser sentence than terms of imprisonment for longer than twenty years. 153 As Mujuzi writes, however, the decision conflicts with a growing international trend to limit life imprisonment terms."' 54 The legal systems of both Uganda and Malawi have recently come under intense international scrutiny because of the criminalization of homosexuality. In Malawi, a homosexual couple was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment with hard labor for engaging in sodomy. 155 After the sentence was upheld on appeal, international pressure forced President Bingu wa Mutharika to pardon the couple. 156 In Uganda, the Anti-Homosexuality Bill of 2009 authorized a mandatory death sentence for persons convicted of "aggravated" sodomy or HIV transmission, eliciting worldwide condemnation despite the mandatory death provision's facial unconstitutionality after Kigula.' 57 While it is unlikely that either country will increase criminal penalties of this nature, particularly given each country's international HIV donor networks, both cases underscore the extent to which harsh criminal punishments for homosexuality retain popular support. Like Malawi, Uganda has also faced legal aid shortages in post-Kigula challenges. A new initiative, developed in October 2011 and funded by the Uganda-based Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives and the British government, will provide free legal assistance to fifteen inmates on death row who are challenging their sentences. 62 In addition, the attorney general conceded that the mandatory death penalty was not constitutional. 163 Nonetheless, the Court found that Mutiso had standing and that the case was ripe for adjudication.' 64 The Court of Appeal invalidated the mandatory death penalty for murder on the grounds that the sentence violated the right to life, that it constituted cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment, and that it violated the right to a fair trial. 16' Like the courts in Malawi and Uganda, the Court cited the seminal case Reyes v. Queen for the inhuman punishment ground. 166 The Kenyan court's framing of the right to life violation was unique. The Malawian court did not reach the issue,1 67 and the Ugandan court avoided it by finding that the death penalty was saved and thus could not violate the right to life. 168 According to the Kenyan court, where the mandatory death penalty fell on defendants who did not necessarily merit the special penalty of death, a right to life violation would occur. 169 Constitutional litigation over the right to life is particularly prolific in Kenya, and a number of seminal legal debates concerning abortion access, domestic violence, and environmental rights have arisen out of the Court of Appeal and constitutional reform process.17 0 A week after the decision in Mutiso, Kenyan voters went to the polls and overwhelmingly ratified a new constitution.
1 71 The scope of the right to life provision, particularly concerning abortion access, proved to be one of the most contentious aspects of the new constitutional draft. 72 The new constitution contains a death penalty savings clause, although it is arguably vaguer than the former constitution and will no doubt lead to continued incremental death
The decision had other similarities to those arising from Uganda and Malawi as well. Although the Court did not explicitly follow Uganda in finding that the mandatory death penalty violated the separation of powers because of legislative constraints on judicial sentencing discretion, it did note the argument in appellant's submissions and quoted this holding from Kigula. 7 4 Perhaps the Court's caution was warranted because the separation of powers was drastically altered under Kenya's new constitution. The Court did dismiss the argument that sentencing discretion was unnecessary because of executive pardon and clemency power, in accordance with Reyes v. The Queen and most other courts, including the Ugandan court. 175 Like Kigula and Kafantayeni, the Kenyan
Court of Appeal cited a wide array of foreign jurisprudence. The Court noted it was "satisfied" that the foreign case law was "persuasive in our jurisdiction and we make no apology for applying" it. 176 Like the Ugandan court, the Kenyan court issued strong dicta indicating that the mandatory death penalty for crimes other than murder was also unconstitutional, including treason, robbery with violence, and attempted robbery with violence-three crimes that have a long history of political prosecutions in Kenya.1 77 The Court also provided strong dicta receptive to a death row syndrome challenge in the future, on the model of the Zimbabwean case Catholic Commission, a challenge that also proved successful in Kigula.
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Finally, the Court successfully bridged the gap between Kenya's independence constitution and the 2010 constitution. Unlike Malawi and Uganda, which have more modem constitutions, Kenya's original constitution possessed a Caribbean-style partial savings clause. 179 The Court interpreted the clause in accordance with the Caribbean cases Reyes, Fox, and Hughes, holding that the mandatory death penalty was a matter of sentencing, not a judicial punishment, and thus was not saved. 1 80 Although the Court resisted an omnibus South African-style death penalty challenge, it was satisfied that the mandatory death penalty would not be resurrected under the new constitution. 181 To this end, the Court based its decision on three fundamental rights that had nearly exact parallels in both constitutions. 82 Like the Ugandan Supreme Court, the Kenyan court looked to drafters' intent, noting that the new constitution "was 173. C.f. CONSTITUTION arrived at through a consultative and public process," and consequently one could assume "that the people of Kenya, owing to their own philosophy and circumstances, have resolved to qualify the right to life and retain the death penalty in the statute books., 183 The Court appeared to close the door on a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty even under the new constitution.
The High Court, the trial-level court in Kenya that possesses original jurisdiction over murder cases, clarified Mutiso in Evanson Muiruri Gichane v. Republic in which the defendant was sentenced to death for attempted robbery with violence.' 8 4 Although the trial court based its decision overturning the death sentence in part on an apparent contradiction in the penal code in which attempted robbery with violence triggered a mandatory death sentence under one provision and only seven years imprisonment under another, the trial court also rested its decision on the Mutiso holding. 85 To that end, the trial court The right to life provision under the new constitution contains two ambiguities. First, the clause that could be construed as "saving" the death penalty is a separate clause from, and not a modifying subclause of, the grammatically absolute right to life. Second, 26(3) appears to be circular, because it states that a person shall not be deprived of life except where constitutionally authorized, and provides no constitutional authorization except for abortion exceptions. According to one of the experts on the Constitutional Review Commission, this ambiguity was intentional, to reconcile Kenyan Despite this split among High Court judges, guidance from the Kenya Court of Appeal thus far has been limited. In March 2012, the Kenya Court of Appeal upheld two discretionary death sentences that were imposed on defendants after they had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence. 
292
[Vol. 22:2 implementing paperless appeals. 98 Currently, the Supreme Court is composed of Chief Justice Willy Mutunga, Deputy Chief Justice Nancy Baraza, and five other justices. Several candidates before the Judicial Services Commission, which is vetting candidates for vacancies in the Kenyan court system, have included judges who explicitly told the panel that they oppose the death penalty based on the wording of the new constitution. 99 Perhaps the long tradition of political executions in late colonial Kenya, the abuse of due process under the Daniel arap Moi regime, the weakness of a pre-colonial death penalty tradition in Kenya, and the attitudes of the political elites tending toward abolition represent a broader ambivalent public attitude. 200 If that is the case, and if Justice Emukule's decision is indicative of the attitudes of the current judiciary, then the death penalty may well be struck down in Kenya by the future Supreme Court.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE AFRICAN CONTRIBUTION TO COMPARATIVE DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE
The abolition of the mandatory death penalty in the common law world is a case study of how international human rights norms are being installed in domestic constitutional jurisprudence intentionally by a small network of lawyers. Although the challenges are incremental, the stated goal is much larger: to end the death penalty worldwide by fundamentally making it more difficult for prisoners to be placed on death row. African countries appear to be following the emerging global consensus that not all murders are equally heinous and deserving of death, that the right to a fair trial includes a sentencing hearing, and that a sentence disproportionate to a crime is cruel and degrading punishment. African courts have increasingly followed the lead of the Privy Council's Caribbean jurisprudence on the scope of executive clemency and appellate review, on delay and conditions on death row, and on the right to appeal to international and regional human rights tribunals. The settled law of the Caribbean, formed over the course of a decade by challenges to supranational tribunals, national courts, the Privy Council in London, and later the Caribbean Court of Justice, has almost entirely dispensed with the mandatory death sentence in the region. 200. For a summary of the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial history of the death penalty in Kenya, see Novak, Kenya, supra note 1.
jurisprudence is being imported to the African continent.
At the same time, African countries have made their own contributions to the global body of death penalty jurisprudence, and will likely be cited in later constitutional challenges to the mandatory death sentence. Just as Edwards v. Bahamas stands for the proposition that the mandatory death penalty violates the right to a fair trial, and Reyes v. The Queen (Belize) is the seminal case finding that the death penalty is cruel and inhuman punishment, so too will the decisions arising from Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda be cited for their original holdings. Kafantayeni is the first case to hold that the mandatory death penalty violates the right of access to the court system for the resolution of disputes because it does not permit true appellate review of a sentence. Kigula was the first case to explicitly hold that the mandatory death penalty violates the constitutional separation of powers because the legislature was constraining judicial sentencing discretion. Mutiso is the first case to find that because the mandatory death penalty is not specifically saved in the constitution, it violates the right to life. In each of these cases, the courts followed the emerging international consensus on the mandatory death penalty but adopted the international norms to their own domestic contexts.
On February 1, 2012, the Supreme Court of India invalidated the mandatory death penalty for an aggravated homicide provision that was intended to reach terrorist groups operating in India. 20 1 This decision, State of Punjab v. Singh (Dalbir), cited global precedent for the proposition that the mandatory death penalty violates the right to a fair trial because it precludes a sentencing hearing for a defendant convicted of murder. 2°2 Among the international authorities cited by the Indian Supreme Court were the decisions in Kafantayeni, Kigula, and Mutiso. 203 The "sharing" of constitutional doctrines, particularly in common law developing countries formerly colonized by Britain, is not a new phenomenon. Many of these countries had expatriate judges and underdeveloped legal doctrines in the decades after independence, and the constitutions drawn up after independence were broadly similar. 20 4 The constitution of India, however, was older than those in Africa and did not follow the template precisely, lacking an explicit ban on cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment. 2 0 5 As a consequence, the Indian Supreme Court in Singh (Dalbir) did more than simply quote case law from Africa, the Caribbean, and elsewhere; the judges performed a searching analysis of the reasoning of other common law courts in order to reach a novel holding based on due process and fair trial rights rather than on the "inhuman punishment" clause. Like the
